In an experiment using two consecutive trust games, we study how "cheap" signals such as promises and messages are used to restore damaged trust and encourage new trust where it did not previously exist. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investmentcontingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much to return. After an unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This naturalistic quasi-experimental design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on naturally occurring remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, and subsequent outcomes. In the first game 16.6% of trustees were distrusted and 18.8% of trusted trustees broke promises. Trustees distrusted in the first game used promises closer to equal splits and messaging to encourage trust in the second game. To restore damaged trust, promise-breakers used larger new promises (signals of intended atonement) and messaging (usually with apology). On average, investments in each game paid off for investors and trustees, suggesting that cheap signals foster profitable trust-based exchanges in these economic games.
Introduction
In modern economies where trust realizes vast amounts of potential gains in transactions involving deferred or risky returns, problems associated with developing and restoring trust are particularly relevant. A scientific understanding of the processes that restore trust when it is damaged and encourage trust where it did not previously exist is therefore of paramount importance. Despite the large literature on damages to corporate reputation (e.g., see Barnett 2003 on US chemical industry disasters; see Robinson & Rousseau 1994 for a survey of corporate trust violations), very little research exists on how damaged trust can be rebuilt and new trust encouraged where it did not previously exist (Dirks et al. 2009 ). Most of the existing research in this area is either purely theoretical (Lewicki & Bunker 1996; Mishra 1996; Lewicki & Wiethoff 2000; Ren & Gray 2009; Gillespie & Dietz 2009 ), based on anecdotal or event-based evidence (Elsbach 1994; Knight & Pretty 1999) , surveys (Slovic 1993) , diary studies (Conway & Briner 2002 ) fabricated vignettes (Tomlinson et al. 2004) , fabricated videotaped dramatizations (Kim et al. 2004 (Kim et al. , 2006 , or incentivized experimental designs using deception (Gibson et al. 1999; Bottom et al. 2002; Nakyachi & Watabe 2005; Schweitzer et al. 2006; Ohtsubo & Watanabe 2009 ). To study how damaged trust can be rebuilt and new trust can be encouraged, we conducted a non-deceptive economic experiment with endogenously created and naturally distributed signals, using financially motivated subjects.
Our experiment is based on a version of the "investment game" by Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995) . In the original investment game an investor is endowed with $10 and can invest any portion of her endowment by sending it to a trustee. The amount sent triples in value before reaching the trustee. Having received funds from this tripled investment, the trustee can reciprocate by returning any portion of these funds to the investor. Since sending money is risky, investments are usually interpreted as trust, and since returning money is costly, reciprocation via returns on investments is interpreted as evidence of trustworthiness.
1 The investment game, therefore, has been extensively used to study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting (for a 1 This interpretation is based on the assumption that participants identify psychological and implied contracts (Rousseau 1989) and in doing so act in accordance with social contracts, though there is no social contract about expected or contingent behavior stated in the standard implementation of the classic "investment game" (see Berg et al. 1995) , which over the years has become better known as the "trust game". In fact, because the assertion that the original game was about "trust" was debatable, John Dickhaut preferred calling it the "investment game" -as it is in the 1995 Berg et al. article . By adding a new starting stage to the game where trustees make promises to return a portion of income from investment -this game becomes a game more explicitly about trust. For this reason we refer to our modified form of the classic investment game, described below, as a "trust game". review see Ostrom & Walker 2005) . A common finding in the literature is that investors tend to exhibit trust and trustees tend to reciprocate. It has also been well established that pre-play communication, even if "irrelevant" to game strategy, can induce higher contributions in public goods games (for meta-analyses see Sally 1995 , Balliet 2010 ) and more cooperation in dyadic social dilemmas (Deutsch 1958 (Deutsch , 1960 Radlow & Weidner 1966; Buchan et al. 2002; Duffy & Feltovich 2006; Bracht & Feltovich 2009 ). However, with the exception of a few studies using deception, the experimental economic literature is silent as to what behavior ensues when promises fail to establish trust and what happens to trust and reciprocity in subsequent interactions after promises are broken and trust is damaged.
Background
Non-binding social contracts based on mutual agreement and advantage can secure opportunities to gain from trade, but may also pose risks to those entering into them: they provide cheaters opportunities for greater immediate gains while consequences to cheaters may be non-existent, uncertain, or delayed. Our research focuses on social contracts in trust-based investment exchanges that provide opportunity for mutual advantage. In these exchanges, we consider trust to be demonstrated when resources or control is willingly ceded to another with the expectation that the other intends to reciprocate. Trustworthiness is demonstrated by reciprocating so as to, at minimum, restitute the loss of resources or control that another has ceded by extending trust.
To successfully navigate a social contract and avoid exploitation by cheaters, it is important for potentially trusting investors to obtain accurate information about the ability and willingness (propensity) of the trustees to carry out their end of the contract. Trusting and trustworthy reputations that have been demonstrated by past actions serve as reliable cues upon which trust-based decisions can be made. Where reputational assurances are not available, such as in novel relationships with unknown partners, credible information about an investor's willingness to trust or a trustee's trustworthiness is not as readily accessible. In the absence of reputational cues, signals 2 are often sent to receivers with the intention to communicate 2 We distinguish cues from signals (borrowing from similar definitions by Diggle et al. 2007; Scott-Phillips 2008) as follows. Cue: Any act or structure that (i) affects the behavior of other organisms; (ii) which is effective because the effect has evolved to be affected by the act or structure; but which (iii) did not evolve. Signal: Any act or structure that (i) affects the behavior of other organisms; (ii) evolved because of those effects; and (iii) which is effective information about the sender (e.g., see Farrel & Rabin 1996) . For example, signals may be sent with the intention of persuading receivers that the sender is more trustworthy than might be inferred from cues alone.
Signals persuading investors of a trustee's trustworthiness are fundamental to developing mutually beneficial relationships under conditions where trust has not yet been established (where cues are not available) and where trust has been damaged but not yet restored (where cues indicate untrustworthiness). Without the effective use of signals, a cooperative interaction may be foregone: potential investors may decide not to extend trust when they lack reputational assurances and when cues indicate a breach of trust. This is true whether trust has been damaged intentionally, accidentally, or as a result of mistaken interpretations of intent (Axelrod & Dion 1988 (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Maynard Smith 1982) . Thus, the existence of signals that can deceive selects for skepticism among potential receivers. Zahavi (1975) partially addressed the fundamental question of "why are signals reliable?" when he suggested that some signals are reliable to the extent they are guaranteed by their costs.
More specifically, the reliability of "costly" signals corresponds (positively) to the costs of their production, especially when the presence of individuals' relevant qualities is a necessary condition for offsetting the "handicapping" costs of developing or sending these signals. Insofar as signal production costs outweigh the benefits gained from using those signals deceptively (but not from using them honestly), reception of signals will continue, and deceptive senders of signals will be out-competed by honest signalers who can afford to signal (Zahavi 1977 (Zahavi , 1993 Enquist 1985; Grafen 1990; Adams & Mesterton-Gibbons 1995) . While evolutionary biologists because the effect (the response) has evolved to be affected by the act or structure.
have been documenting examples of costly signaling among non-human animals, 3 economists have been documenting qualifying human examples from field studies and laboratory experiments. 4 Yet, despite the growing catalogue of "costly signal" examples, the theory used to justify their evolution only helps explain a small fraction of human signal phenomena.
We are interested in the use of less understood "cheap" signals (e.g., personalized messages, promises of reciprocation, and apologies) that do not directly affect payoffs of the game, or require substantial costs for production, yet are common features of trust-based social contracts. Personalized communication that reveals something about the sender may facilitate social contracts (Buchan et al. 2002; Ridings et al. 2002 , Zheng et al. 2002 by decreasing social distance, raising solidarity, and signaling the cues of familiarity that are normally associated with trustworthy relationships. Bohnet & Frey (1999) demonstrate that personal identification, even when only one-way, leads to efficient outcomes in dyadic interactions. Promises and non-binding messages by trustees have been shown to increase cooperation (Orbell et al. 1988 , Rubin & Brown 1975 Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland 1994 , Elingsen & Johannesson 2004 Charness & Dufwenberg 2006) . Explanations and apologies have also been shown to have great effect on eliciting forgiveness (Lewicki & Bunker 1996; Girard & Mullet 1997; Girard et al. 2002; McCullough et al. 1997 McCullough et al. , 1998 Ohbuchi et al. 1989; Tavuchis 1991; Witvliet et al. 2002; Benoit & Drew 1997) and ensuring future trust , especially when expressing an offender's guilt over past actions (Wubben et al. 2009 ) and when combined with offers to engage in atonement (Gibson et al. 1999) . These remedial strategies are based on cheap signals (which presents us with the credibility problem identified by signaling theory), raising the questions of 3 e.g. the roars of red deer, Cervus elaphus (Clutton-Brock & Albon 1979); spotting by Thompson's gazelles, Gazella thomsonii (Fitzgibbon & Fanshawe 1988) ; musth in male African elephants Loxodonta africana (Poole 1987 (Poole , 1989 ; and tail display of peacocks, Pavo cristatus (Petrie et al. 1991; Zahavi & Zahavi 1997) . 4 Spence (1973 Spence ( , 1974 has argued that the years one has spent getting an education and earning degrees signal not only intelligence, but also commitment to long-term investments and the ability to work effectively within a structured institution to prospective employers. On average, these are qualities without which degrees become too costly for unintelligent, uncommitted, or undisciplined people to get. If degrees were easy to get, they would not be reliable proxies for a worker's propensity to be productive. Camerer (1988) suggests that an engagement ring also functions as a costly signal of a suitor's intentions to engage in a lifetime of familial production, whereas "the lusty bachelor whose planning extends only to dawn cannot afford such costly investments" (p. S183). Gambetta (2009) describes how in prisons inmates use costly signals of "toughness" that only those with certain qualities can afford: scars from knife stabs or bullet wounds (indicating that one has been through fights yet survived), willingness to engage in fighting, and even self-inflicted harm (demonstrating one's ability to tolerate pain). In a recently laboratory study, Fehrler and Przepiorka (2011) demonstrate that donors to charity are both expected to be and found to be more trustworthy in social exchange than non-donors.
how do people attempt using cheap signals, when do they actually "work", and who benefits from their use?
We suggest that by imposing cost (after discovering signals were false) on dishonest signalers (e.g., by excluding them from future trust-based exchanges or by spreading negative reputational information that will cause others to exclude them), receivers can make the propensity to engage in false signaling effectively "costly" enough that dishonest signalers do not gain net benefits from sending false signals. We are careful to point out that while sanctioning of false signals can reduce the frequency of their use in a population, it is not expected to drive them entirely to extinction. In fact, where opportunity costs of forgone trustbased exchange are larger, the tolerable proportion of dishonest signals to honest signals is larger. Specifically, the logic of error management theory (for a review see Haselton & Nettle 2006) predicts that despite the existence of false signaling and the costs of receiving false signals, signals will tend to be received when opportunity costs associated with not receiving true signals of trustworthiness (from forgone advantageous exchange) are greater than costs associated with receiving false signals of trustworthiness (from pursued trust-based exchange that produced a loss). The economically justified tolerance of some false signals also predicts that individuals will exploit opportunities to profit by using false signals to conceal untrustworthiness.
In sum, we argue that cheap signals can evolve based on the calculus of their production and reception costs, but that for this to happen, they should be more profitable on average to both sender and receiver than in their absence. Following this logic, we expect that cheap signals can be used to encourage new trust and restore trust that has been damaged, but that in order to do so reliably, these signals must yield relatively greater benefits to both signaler and target on average. In the laboratory, our experimental design allows us to hone in on participants' use of the cheap signaling opportunities provided. Investigating whether these cheap signals, so important to our everyday trust-based interactions, are alive and well in the laboratory, we make several predictions. First, we predict that trustees whose actions have already produced cues establishing their trustworthy reputations (by keeping promises and not succumbing to more profitable opportunism) will be less incentivized (than previously untrusted trustees, or trustees whose reputations indicate untrustworthiness) to spend time and effort constructing messages to persuade investors to trust them. Previously untrusted trustees who have no established trustworthiness to rely on and untrustworthy trustees (i.e., promise-breakers) are expected to make use of promises and messages to affect investors' decisions to trust. We expect that when used and "working" to affect investors' trust, signals conveying a trustworthy propensity will provide benefits to both investor and trustee on average.
Present Study
Our experiment is based on a version of the "investment game" by Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995) . In our experiment we use two consecutive trust games to study how "cheap" signals such as promises and messages are used to restore damaged trust and encourage new trust where it did not previously exist. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much income to return.
After the unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This naturalistic quasi-experimental design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on naturally occurring "cheap" remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, and subsequent behaviors. In the first game 18.8% of trusted trustees broke promises and 16.6% of trustees were distrusted. Promise-breakers used cheap signals in the form of promises of larger than previously promised returns (a signal of intended atonement) and messaging (usually with apology) to restore damaged trust. Trustees who were distrusted in the first game used new promises closer to a 50/50 split and messaging to encourage trust in the second game. On average, investments paid off (for investors and trustees) in each game, netting greater earnings than non-investments.
Theories of reciprocity predict that individuals will regulate their willingness to deliver benefits (i.e., to trust) based on their expectations of another's trustworthiness. We expect that selection pressures derived from this incentive structure have put a premium on signals that convey trustworthiness, conceal untrustworthiness, and restore trustworthiness following damage to others' trust. We test our predictions from signaling theory concerning the conditions under which we expect to see cheap signals "working" to affect trust, and providing benefits for signal senders and receivers. Special attention is given to how promises are used to encourage trust where it did not previously exist and how apology and atonement can restore damaged trust.
Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University's ESI laboratory. 458 participants (229 pairs) were recruited from a standard campus-wide subject pool for participation in an experiment that could last up to 45 minutes. Participants interacted with each other anonymously over a local computer network. The experiment, which lasted an average of 35 minutes total, proceeded as follows. Upon arrival, participants in the experiment were told that they would receive $7 for participation, to be paid at the end of the experiment. Participants then received instructions (see Appendix A) for a single trust game (with no indication of a subsequent game to follow).
Subjects were assigned to one of two roles: "Participant A" for the investor or After the first trust game had been completed, participants were given instructions (see Appendix A) indicating that a second trust game identical to the first would follow. In this second trust game, participants were paired with the same partner and played the same role as in the first game. However, prior to the second game, the trustee was given an opportunity to use a text box to send a one-way message to the investor (e.g., to apologize for the broken promise) and to make a new promise (e.g., to signal intended atonement). Trustees were instructed that "in these messages, no one is allowed to identify him or herself by name, number, gender, or appearance", but that other than these restrictions, trustees could "say anything in the message."
If trustees wished not to send a message they were instructed to "simply click on the send button without having typed anything in the message box." The computer conveyed the trustee's message and promise to the appropriate investor, and then the second trust game began. We specified that the second game was the last and final part of the experiment (i.e., there would be no subsequent games).
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There were 25 experimental sessions. Each session had between 10 and 24 participants.
The average experimental earnings, including $7 for arriving to the experiment on time and participating, were $25, ranging from a low of $7 to a high of $47. No participant participated more than once, and no participant had prior experience with a similar game environment.
Results

Game 1
We expect trustees to promise investors transfers of at least $6 (minimally higher than the payoff to the investor if he chooses OUT), and closer to the focal point of $10 -an even split, but less than $20. Promises of $20, if honored, would not provide financial benefit to the promisemakers and are therefore not expected. Wary that trustees' have less incentive to honor promises closer to $20 than to the 50/50 split of $10, we also expect that investors should be more suspicious of the veracity of larger promises and therefore be less likely to invest in higher promises. Trustees who have been trusted should tend to make good on their promises (or, at least, yield returns on investments that are profitable to investors on average). These predictions stand in stark contrast to the set of rational choice predictions that expect non-binding promises to have no effect on investors. According to rational choice theory, trustees who receive incomes should return nothing (despite what they may have promised) and, based on this, investors should always choose to not invest (regardless of the promise they received). We evaluate whether the use of Game 1 promises affected investor willingness to make trust-based investments, and whether investments made based on promises resulted in greater benefits (than non-investments) for both investor and trustee in Game 1. The distribution of promises in Figure 2 indicates that investors who chose IN received promises in the range of $6-5 After each trust game subjects were also asked to fill out a 20 item survey in which they reported their emotional states consequent on their decisions, game interactions, and resulting outcomes. Analysis and discussion of the mediating roles of emotions are not included in this paper.
$19 (99% of the time) and the most commonly received promise was for $10 (more than 50% of the time), while the investors who chose OUT received lower promises on average (i.e., $8.61
(SD=4.33) versus $9.31 (SD=1.75); Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test, p-value=0.01, n 1 =191, n 2 =38), and received either relatively high or relatively low promises overall. To confirm this observation, we estimated the effect with probit models as in Table 1 (specifications 1 and 2),
where the dependent variable is the investment decision in Game 1 (Invest1) and the independent variables are the promise by trustee (Promise1) and the promise squared (Promise1sqr). In specification (1), the Promise1 variable is insignificant, indicating that there is no linear relationship between the probability of investment and the promised amount. On the other hand, in specification (2), the Promise1 and Promise1sqr variables are both significant, indicating that the probability of investment is significantly higher for the moderate promises (e.g., $10 or 50% of the income).
Game 1 investments made based on promises resulted in greater benefits (than not investing) for both investor and trustee in Game 1 since investors who chose IN received back $8.19 on average, which is substantially higher than their original endowment of $5 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n=191). Compared to the $0 earned by untrusted trustees, trusted trustees earned an average of $11.81 in Game 1 (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test, p-value<0.001, n 1 =38, n 2 =191). The OLS estimation of specifications (3) and (4) in Table 1 indicates that the amount returned by trustee (Return1) has a non-linear relationship with the promised amount (Promise1, Promise1sqr). Specifically, returns are significantly lower for the relatively high and relatively low promises. This estimation provides evidence consistent with our prediction that those investors who chose OUT when faced with relatively low or high promises (Figure 2 ), would have done so out of anticipation of lower investor payoffs that we observe from investments in those promises.
For the investors who chose IN, the average amount returned of $8.19 was significantly lower than the average promise of $9.31 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n 1 =n 2 =191).
Despite average returns being lower than promised, we find that promises of future returns tended to be veridical; 81.2% of trusted promises (155/191) were kept (i.e., the amount returned was equal to or greater than the promise), and 18.8% (36/191) were broken (i.e., the amount returned was less than the promise). Below we will refer to "promise-keepers", meaning those who exactly kept or exceeded their promised returns when invested in. "Promise-breakers" will be used below to exclusively refer to those who returned less than they promised to return when invested in (regardless of whether the return was profitable to the investor).
Game 2
While cheap signals are manipulated by trustees, affect investors, and provide net benefits to both investors and trustees in Game 1 Table 2 (specifications 1 and 2) indicates that the decision to invest in Game 2 (Invest2) mainly depends on the promise in Game 2 (Promise2, Promise2sqr), with no significant effects found for Game 1 distrusted versus trusted trustees (Distrusted1) or for Game 1 promise-keepers versus promisebreakers (Broken1). In the sections below we further explore the effect of promises and messages on Game 2 investments within the subsamples aggregated by Game 1 decisions.
We evaluate whether the use of Game 2 promises and the extent of promise-breaking in Game 1 affected investor willingness to make trust-based investments, and whether investments made based on new promises and the extent to which promises were previously broken resulted in greater benefits (than from non-investment) for both investor and trustee in Game 2. Overall, the investments made in Game 2 again paid off since their investors received an average $8.73
return from their investment choice IN, which is significantly higher than the OUT payoff of $5
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n=200). The estimation of specifications (3) and (4) in Table 2 indicates that, similar to Game 1, returns in Game 2 (Return2) depend on promises made in Game 2, although linearly this time (Promise2). In addition, returns negatively depend on the extent of the broken promise in Game 1 (Promise1-Return1), suggesting that trustees' extent of untrustworthiness (defined by the amount which a return was less than promised) in Game 1 is predictive of earnings that investors can expect in Game 2. Overall, similar to Game 1, promises of profitable returns on investment in Game 2 tended to be veridical; 75% of promises (150/200) were kept or exceeded, and 25.0% (50/200) were broken. In the sections below we further explore the effect of promises and messages on Game 2 earnings within the subsamples aggregated by Game 1 decisions.
Game 1 Promise-Keepers
For the subset of 155 promise-keeping trustees (i.e., those who did not break their promises in Game 1), we observe slightly higher average promises in Game 2. Figure 3 displays the histogram of promises made in Game 2 by 155 promise-keepers from Game 1. These trustees promised to return an average of $9.46 in Game 2, which is higher than their average promise of $9.02 in Game 1 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n 1 =n 2 =155).
Perhaps as a consequence of Game 2 promises close to 50/50 splits of income, 92.3% of Game 2 investors in Game 1 promise-keepers (143/155) chose IN. Note that the investment rate of 92.3% is higher (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test, p-value=0.007, n 1 =155, n 2 =229) than the investment rate of 83.4% in Game 1 (191/229). While this rate increase in trust may be explained in part by updated promises in Game 2 ($9.46 versus $9.02), it can also be explained by the profitable returns transferred, which for promise-keepers was always the amount that they promised or more. Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 3 support the conjectures that new Game 2 promises and Game 1 returns by promise-keepers affect Game 2 investments. 6 Specifically, specification (1) indicates that Game 2 investment decisions (Invest2) are positively correlated with returns in Game 1 (Return1) and non-empty messages (Message). Specification (2) indicates that when promises are updated nonlinearly, Game 2 investment decisions (Invest2) are positively correlated with updated Game 2 promises (Promise2, Promise2sqr) and non-empty messages (Message).
We predicted that -due to their established reputations of trustworthiness (as compared to either promise-breakers or distrusted trustees) -Game 1 promise-keepers were relatively less incentivized to spend time and effort constructing messages to persuade investors to choose IN in Game 2, and so would send both shorter messages and a greater frequency of empty messages in Game 2. Game 1 promise-keepers' messages contained fewer words than messages from both Game 1 untrusted trustees and Game 1 promise-breakers (M=11.41 versus M=22.9, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01, n 1 =155, n 2 =74). Comparatively, Game 1 promise-keepers' messages were also more frequently empty (20% versus 11% of the time, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.06, n 1 =155, n 2 =74).
We evaluate whether investments made based on new promises and non-empty messages resulted in benefits for both investor and trustee in Game 2, and whether these signals were Compared to $0 earned by untrusted Game 1 promise-keepers in Game 2, promise-keepers also profited from trusted promises in Game 2 earning $11.38 on average (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test, p-value<0.01, n 1 =12, n 2 =143). Specification (3) in Table 3 indicates a positive linear relationship for Game 2 returns (Return2) and promises (Promise2), again further confirming that the trusted promises are reliable cues of returns (which are profitable on average). No significant effect of promise-keepers messages (Message) was seen on Game 2 returns (Return2). We expect that the use of apologies (i.e., with remorse, regret, or sorrow stemming from acknowledgment of offense) 7 should increase investors' willingness to reinvest in promisebreakers. Out of 30 messages with content, we coded 10 messages as apologies. 8 We find that 90.0% (9/10) of apologizers were retrusted in comparison to only 61.5% (16/26) of nonapologizers (Fisher's exact test, p-value=0.10, n=36), indicating that messages with apology are more likely to restore trust after broken promises than empty messages or messages without apology.
Game 1 Promise-Breakers
To study the link between messages expressing regret for an offensive action (apology) and intensions to demonstrate atonement (new larger promises) we evaluate whether apologies issued in the experiment actually correlated with larger promises of intended reciprocations.
Among Game 1 promise-breakers, the restitution promised (i.e., Promise2-Promise1) by signals of intended atonement is significantly higher for those participants who issued an apology than for those who did not ($3.00 versus $0.65; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value=0.06, n 1 =10, n 2 =20). Promise-breakers who sent a non-apology message (20/30) increased promises by $0.65 (SD=3.20), while promise-breakers who sent an apology message (10/30) increased promises by $3.00 (SD=2.62). When compared to the whole population of trustees, the difference is even more striking. For 10 trustees who issued apologies the increase in promises is more than six times higher than for all other 219 trustees ($3.00 versus $0.48; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, pvalue<0.01, n 1 =10, n 2 =219), indicating that apologetic trustees increased their second promises more than all other trustees.
Thus far, we have only considered the independent effects of intended atonement (new larger promises) and messages in restoring damaged trust, but recognize that these remedial strategies are often used together. Next, we estimate probit regressions as in Table 4 to identify how these remedial strategies work in conjunction. Specification (1) indicates that the two most significant predictors of trust in Game 2 (Invest2) are new larger promises (Promise2-Promise1) and non-empty messages (Message). Specification (2) shows that in addition trust is negatively affected by the magnitude of broken promise in Game 1 (Promise1-Return1). These results indicate that investors respond to the combined effects of adjusted promises and longer messages by making trust-based investments in Game 2 in previously distrusted trustees.
Evolutionary theory argues that signals like apologies and promises of intended atonement should have evolved only if they provided net benefits to both the senders and receivers of the signals. We evaluate whether Game 1 promise-breakers' signals resulted in benefits for both investor and trustee in Game 2, and whether these signals were reliable indicators of subsequent trustee behaviors. Investors in Game 1 promise-breakers were returned on average $7.28, which is significantly higher than the OUT payoff of $5 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value=0.05, n=25). Moreover, Game 1 promise-breakers returned significantly more in Game 2 than in Game 1 ($7.28 versus $4.60; Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n 1 =n 2 =25). This is also true when we look at investments in the subset of 9 out of 10 trustees who explicitly issued apologies and where retrusted ($6.78 versus $4.22; Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value=0.06, n 1 =n 2 =9). Although on average investments in Game 2 paid off, we still find that 60.0% (15/25) of trustees who broke their promises in Game 1 (and were subsequently retrusted), broke their promises again in Game 2 -almost irrespective of the apologies and new promises. Apologies were not veridical on average; 9 only 4/9 (44.4%) retrusted apologizers kept Game 2 promises, 10 a greater but not significantly different (Fisher's exact test, p-value=0.53, n=25) proportion than 6/16 (37.5%) retrusted non-apologizers who kept Game 2 promises. From specifications (3) and (4) in Table 4 , it appears that the most significant predictor for return in Game 2 (Return2) from a promise breaker is a sent message with content (Message).
Game 1 Distrusted
9 Likewise, of the 18 more broadly defined apologies that were retrusted, only 44.4% were veridical. 10 8 of these 9 apologizers also signaled intended atonement.
As mentioned, 38 out of 229 trustees (16.6%) were not trusted in Game 1 (see Figure 1 ).
We attribute this distrust to the fact that these trustees offered either relatively high or relatively low promises (see right panel of Figure 2 ). In particular, in Game 1, 55.3% (21/38) of distrusted trustees promised less than $9 while another 10.5% (4/38) of them promised more than $11. As with our Game 1 predictions of trusted promises, we expect that distrusted trustees would adjust their promises towards the modal and more trusted promise of $10, that these adjustments would affect decisions to invest, and that investments made based on adjusted promises would benefit both the investor and trusted. Next, we analyze whether new trust in previously distrusted trustees can be statistically attributed to how distrusted trustees utilized messages and recalibrated promises. We expected that distrusted trustees would construct longer messages with content (and be more incentivized to do so than trustees who had already established reputations of trustworthiness) to persuade investors to choose IN in Game 2. Table B2 in Appendix B reports the messages that were sent by 38 trustees who were distrusted in Game 1. Analyzing these messages, we find that 94.7%
(36/38) of the messages used by distrusted trustees have some content. Game 1 distrusted messages contain more words than messages from Game 1 promise-keepers (M=26.6 versus M=11.4, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01, n 1 =38, n 2 =155). These data suggest that distrusted trustees use both promises adjusted towards 50/50 divisions of income and longer messages to persuade investors to trust them. The estimation of specification (1) in of trusted trustees who broke their promises in Game 1. The estimation of specification (2) in Table 5 shows very weak correlation between Game 1 distrusted trustees' returns in Game 2 (Return2) and their promises (Promise2, Promise2sqr), suggesting that the extent to which the 37.5% of Game 1 distrusted trustees break their Game 2 promises is noteworthy. It is possible that the some newly trusted trustees who broke their promises in Game 2 did so in order to punish investors for their distrust in Game 1. By doing so these presumed punishers ended up earning an average of $17.42 in two games, closer to the average earning of $21.99 across two games for Game1 trusted trustees, than the average earnings of $10.55 for newly trusted trustees who did not break promises in Game2.
Discussions and Conclusions
Opportunities for mutual gains often exist where previous trust-based exchange histories
have not yet been developed, or where trust has been damaged by a failure to meet expectations.
Our natural experiment demonstrates that in these situations people use (i.e. send and receive) cheap signals to encourage new trust and rebuild damaged trust, despite the risks that these signals may be dishonest.
With promises used to encourage new trust in Game 1, and among untrusted trustees in Game 2, we see that IN decisions by investors are higher when promised returns are within the range that would provide benefits to both signal sender and receiver, and especially when the promised split is even (where conflict between individual incentives is balanced). We suggest two reasons why non-binding promises were effectively used to establish new trust in our experiment.
First, if the promises themselves are not costly, then the credence they are given by investors may be driven by a default assumption that future exclusion of cheaters and the spread of negative gossip concerning their untrustworthy reputations will make the cost of defection high enough (e.g., see Delton et al. 2011) . For investors in our games, what is certain is that the investment decision may be the last investment decision (because Game 1 is describe as a single interaction with no indication that future interactions in the pairing are to be expected, and the unexpected Game 2 is described as a single interaction with assurance that no further games will occur). Investors' ability to use exclusion based on discovery of broken promises is therefore not a certainty in either interaction. Yet, despite the propositional information of these games, the mind is not designed for terminal anonymous interactions. We expect that evolved psychologies bring psychological contracts with an assumption of excludability into the lab, which lends credence to the signals (but not for reasons provided by the game environment). While we find this argument convincing, we do not present direct evidence to support it.
Second, despite promises not being costly (i.e., dishonest promise makers will profit when trusted), potential receivers of these signals need to maximize their tradeoffs between costs of type I errors (i.e., losses of endowment from making trust-based investments based on promises that are not honest) and the costs of type II errors (i.e., losses from foregone returns from not making trust-based investments based on distrusting promises that were honest). Where opportunity costs of forgone trust-based exchange are larger, the tolerable proportion of dishonest signals to honest signals is larger. Unlike the standard investment game that uses a multiplier of 3, we used a multiplier of 4 -which ultimately created a large opportunity cost for investors who chose OUT. Game 1 Investors who chose IN received back $8.19 on average, which is substantially higher than their original endowment of $5. Despite the rate of broken promises observed in Game 1, trusted promises produced more profits for investors than untrusted promises. We suspect that the signaling psychology used by senders is sensitive to the tradeoffs considered by investors as evidence by the non-random distribution of promises made and the correspondence of this distribution to promises trusted. Likewise we suspect that the extent to which promises are broken is a product of the net profits to investors, the amount originally promised, and profits to promise breakers.
In Game 
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Based on our findings and a review of the current literature we suggest three steps that can be taken as a remedial strategy to restore damaged trust. First, when trust in a relationship has been damaged, the offender should recognize the damage, empathize with the victim's perspective, and communicate a desire to implement change in the relationship. An optimistic perspective on relationships fraught with damaged trust recognizes that they actually represent 12 Hirshleifer (1984) theorized that emotions act as "guarantors of threats and promises" and several authors (Van Kleef et al. 2004 Sinaceur & Tiedens 2006 , Wubben et al. 2008 Stouten & De Cremer 2010) have demonstrated experimentally that displays of emotion (including anger, guilt, happiness, disappointment, worry, regret) are used by observers for subsequent decision making in social dilemmas and negotiations.
opportunities to develop better relations than previously established. Second, to persuade and assure victims that relationship repair is possible the offender must signal seriousness, commitment, and give indication of the value that is recognized in the other, which is the basis and motivation for actual change to come. In signaling recognition of relationship value it is important not to express a selfish welfare perspective, but instead an other-regarding or shared welfare perspective. Third, to actually begin the process of changing and redefining the relationship, an offender must be willing to expeditiously take on costs by either sacrificing wealth or status, or by taking action to correct the previous imbalance of welfare that was realized by the transgression. When corrective actions cannot be taken, signals of intent to take corrective actions should be used. These three steps are identified as each having independent effects of improving impressions of the offender (Scher & Darley 1997; Schlenker 1980) As the natural occurrence of deceit in social exchanges is sampled and the effectiveness of strategies, tools, and institutions used to combat it are evaluated, practical insights are gleaned that can be extended to our personal lives, to the work of policy makers, and even applied to the handling of firms and industry affairs. We strongly encourage further efforts to uncover effective strategies for building up trust where previous trust-based exchange histories had not been developed, or where trust had been damaged by reciprocation failure. 
REPETITION OF THE EXPERIMENT
The same decision tasks that were just completed will be repeated again, with everyone remaining in the same A or B roles and paired with the same participants as in the previous tasks.
MESSAGE
Prior to repetition of the previous decision tasks, B has an option to send a message to A. B may use a text box to type a message, if desired. We will allow time as needed to construct and type messages. When B's message has been completed (by typing in the text box and clicking on the send button) it will be conveyed by the computer to the appropriate Participant A, and then A and B will proceed with decision tasks. In these messages, no one is allowed to identify him or herself by name, number, gender, or appearance. Other than these restrictions, B may say anything in the message. If you wish not to send a message, simply click on the send button without having typed anything in the message box.
DECISION TASKS AND SURVEY (REPEATED AS BEFORE)
This second set of decision tasks and the accompanying 20 item survey is the final part of the experiment. There will be no further tasks. I want to split the money right down the middle. I will give you ten dollars and I will get ten dollars. If you choose out you will get less and both of us will come out empty handed. This is for the benefit of both parties and you will make more money in this way than you will by opting out. How about 10? We will both make the same amount evenly. 10 YES 10 10 I am a person of my word. I will transfer back $10 so we both make the same amount of money and more money than if you pick OUT 10 YES 10 10 I will offer 10 dollars of my income to you. If you choose in, then you will recieve 10 dollars and i will recieve 10 dollars. If you choose out, you will only recieve 5 dollars.
Appendix B: Messages
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YES 10
20
I will split it with you so we both get ten dollars. 10 YES 10 6 9 YES 9 6
Please trust me when I say I will give you the amount I will promise you. This way, we will both earn more money instead of you just earnint $5 and me earning nothing. Let's take all of their money together! 7 YES 7 5 I will transfer 10 dollars. 10 YES 10 5
Hey ¶ to make this a win-win situation for both of us ¶ I'll transfer $10 and that way both of us will earn the same amount. It's really a good gameplan. :) We can figure out a way to divide the amount of the $20 equally if the result from that will have us leave here with more than $7 10 YES 9 10 I won't ask you to trust me. That's your choice ¶ what I will say though is offer you $10 to each of us. We both walk away from this evenly and both better off than we came in. 6 I promise to give you $7 for clicking "in." I guarantee it. As I see it ¶ this gives you $2 more dollars than you would recieve by clicking "out." It's a win-win situation. You'll get more than $5.
NO 8
Hello there! So it's probably hard to trust me ¶ in that I will return your money? And I would quite frankly feel the same way. The thing is though that you don't know me but I know me and I know that when I make a promise I keep it. I hope you can trust in me. :) Let's make some MONEY :) click in on all of them and i'll try and make it as fair as possible.
NO
YES 10
9 9 I hope you are satisfied with the amount of money I offered you. I will offer more this time.
10 10 I don't really have anything to say...let's split the money 10-10 again 10 YES 10 10 10 $10 is better than $5. Trust me, I'm a doctor haha 10 YES 10 6 6 6 YES 6 7 7 I will do exactly the same thing as I did before. 7 YES 7 10 10 Lets split it 11/ 9 everytime, that way we both get more money IN than OUT? sound good? I don't think you can answer me. . .
YES 9
6 6 Again I will promise $6. Please choose IN as it will maximize the profit that both of us can potentially made. I promise that I will send the full amount and if we can trust each other i will increase the amount I send in the following round. Thank you. 10 10 I'm not a risk taker and I'm not a dick. I said I'd give back ten before, and I did. We both want money. You can make $5 or $10 because I will give you ten again. yayyy money=)) 10 YES 10 10 10 If we do this again, i'm always going to keep it equal for both of us. 10 YES 10 10 10 Hi, so I know it's hard to trust someone who you don't even know but I'll be I'll do my best to make things work.
10 10 I figure we are both equally desperate for cash. 10 YES 10 9 9 Hi Participant A ¶ I hope you trust me due to the previous round. I will take care of you and uphold to my promises, if you take care of me. Deal? Now lets do this and make some bank! ¶ ¶ Signed, ¶ Participant B Let's split it half and half ¶ ten dollars. 10 YES 10 10 10 Hello "A". Based on our last experiment we have established trust ¶ so thanks for making that happen! I will repeat the same steps as last time to ensure that we both get the same amount of money at our maximum level ¶ 10$ each.it makes no sense to betray each other because we just come out of this thing with less money on both parts. Lets get rich!! 10 YES 1 10 10 im going to offer you 10 again ¶ take it and we can profti equally 10 YES 0 9 9 Hey just to let you know ¶ I try my best to never lie in life and I include this experiment part of my life standard so I won't lie. Let's do the same...It worked and we both made some money!!!! 9 YES 9 10 10 Hey beautiful. I hopee your having a good day. Truthfully ¶ I'll get you more money if you say IN.
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